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Abstract
We present the logic iJT4, which is an explicit version of intu-
itionistic S4 and establish soundness and completeness with respect
to modular models.
1 Introduction
Justification logics are explicit modal logics in the sense that they unfold the
-modality in families of so-called justification terms. Instead of formulas
A, meaning that A is known, justification logics include formulas t : A,
meaning that A is known for reason t.
Artemov’s original semantics for the first justification logic, the Logic of
Proofs LP, was a provability semantics that interpreted t : A roughly as t
represents a proof of A in the sense of a formal proof predicate in Peano
Arithmetic [1, 2, 17].
Later Fitting [12] interpreted justifications as evidence in a more general
sense and introduced epistemic, i.e., possible world, models for justification
logics. These models have been further developed to modular models as we
use them in this paper [5, 15]. This general reading of justification led to
many applications in epistemic logic [3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 16].
Given the interpretation of LP in Peano Arithmetic, it was a natural
question to find an intuitionistic version iLP of LP that is the logic of proofs
of Heyting arithmetic. The work by Artemov and Iemhoff [6] and later by
Dashkov [11] provides such an iLP. It turned out that iLP is not only LP with
the underlying logic changed to intuitionistic propositional logic. In order to
get a complete axiomatization with respect to provability semantics, one also
has to include certain admissible rules of Heyting arithmetic as axioms in iLP
so that they are represented by novel proof terms.
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The main contribution of the present paper is that these additional axioms
are not needed if we are interested in completeness with respect to modu-
lar models. We introduce the intuitionistic justification logic iJT4CS, which
is simply LP over an intuitionistic base instead of a classical one but with-
out any additional axioms. We introduce possible world models for iJT4CS
that are inspired by the Kripke semantics for intuitionistic S4 and establish
completeness of iJT4CS with respect to these models.
2 Intuitionistic Justification Logic
In this section, we introduce the syntax for the justification logic iJT4CS,
which is the explicit analogue of the intuitionistic modal logic iS4.
Definition 2.1 (Justification Terms). We assume a countable set of justifi-
cation constants and a countable set of justification variables. Justification
terms are inductively defined by:
1. each justification constant and each justification variable is a justifica-
tion term;
2. if s and t are justification terms, then so are
• (s · t), read s dot t,
• (s+ t), read s plus t,
• !s, read bang s.
We denote the set of terms by Tm.
Definition 2.2 (Formulas). We assume a countable set Prop of atomic
propositions. The set of formulas LJ is inductively defined by:
1. every atomic proposition is a formula;
2. the constant symbol ⊥ is a formula;
3. If A and B are formulas, then (A ∧ B), (A ∨ B) and (A → B) are
formulas;
4. if A is a formula and t a term, then t : A is a formula.
Definition 2.3. The axioms of iJT4 consist of the following axioms:
1. all axioms for intuitionistic propositional logic
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2. t : (A→ B)→ (s : A→ t · s : B)
3. t : A→ t+ s : A and s : A→ t+ s : A
4. t : A→ A
5. t : A→ !t : t : A
A constant specification CS is any subset
CS ⊆ {(c, A) | c is a constant and A is an axiom of iJT4}.
A constant specification CS is called axiomatically appropriate if for each
axiom A of iJT4, there is a constant c such that (c, A) ∈ CS.
For a constant specification CS the deductive system iJT4CS is the Hilbert
system given by the axioms above and by the rules modus ponens and axiom
necessitation:
A A→ B
B
(c, A) ∈ CS
c : A
As usual in justification logic, we can establish the deduction theorem
and the internalization property.
Theorem 2.4 (Deduction Theorem). For every set of formulas M and all
formulas A,B we have that
M ∪ {A} ⊢iJT4CS B ⇐⇒ M ⊢iJT4CS A→ B.
Lemma 2.5 (Internalization for Arbitrary Terms). Let CS be an axiomati-
cally appropriate constant specification. For arbitrary formulas A,B1, . . . , Bn
and arbitrary terms s1, . . . , sn, if
B1, . . . , Bn ⊢iJT4CS A,
then there is a term t ∈ Tm such that
s1 : B1, . . . , sn : Bn ⊢iJT4CS t : A.
3 Basic Modular Models
Basic modular models are syntactic models for justification logic. Yet, our
basic modular models will include possible worlds in order to deal with the
intuitionistic base logic. After defining basic modular models for intuitionistic
justification logic, we will prove soundness and completeness.
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Definition 3.1 (Basic evaluation). A basic evaluation is a tuple (W,≤, ∗)
where
W 6= ∅ and ≤ is a partial order on W,
∗ : Prop×W → {0, 1} ∗ : Tm×W → P(LJ)
(where we often write t∗
w
for ∗(t, w)), such that for arbitrary s, t ∈ Tm and
any formula A,
(1) s∗
w
· t∗
w
⊆ (s · t)∗;
(2) s∗
w
∪ t∗
w
⊆ (s+ t)∗
w
;
(3) (t, A) ∈ CS =⇒ A ∈ t∗
w
;
(4) s : s∗
w
⊆ (!s)∗
w
.
Furthermore, it has to satisfy the following monotonicity conditions:
(M1) p∗
w
= 1 and w ≤ v =⇒ p∗
v
= 1;
(M2) w ≤ v =⇒ t∗
w
⊆ p∗
v
.
Strictly speaking we should use the notion of a CS basic evaluation be-
cause of condition (3) depends on a given CS. However, the constant speci-
fication will always be clear from the context and we can safely omit it. The
same also holds for modular models (to be introduced later).
Definition 3.2 (Truth under Basic Evaluation). Let M = (W,≤, ∗) be a
basic evaluation. For w ∈ W , we define (M, w)  A by induction on the
formula A as follows:
• (M, w) 2 ⊥;
• (M, w)  p iff ∗(p, w) = 1;
• (M, w)  A ∧ B iff (M, w)  A and (M, w)  B;
• (M, w)  A ∨ B iff (M, w)  A or (M, w)  B;
• (M, w)  A→ B iff (M, v)  B for all v ≥ w with (M, v)  A;
• (M, w)  t : A iff A ∈ t∗
w
.
Lemma 3.3 (Monotonicity). For any basic evaluation M = (W,≤, ∗), states
w, v ∈ W and any formula A:
(M, w)  A and w ≤ v =⇒ (M, v)  A.
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Definition 3.4 (Factive Evaluation). A basic evaluation M = (W,≤, ∗) is
called factive iff
A ∈ t∗
w
=⇒ (M, w)  A
for all formulas A, all justification terms t and all states w ∈ W .
Definition 3.5 (Basic modular model). A basic modular model is a basic
evaluation (W,≤, ∗) that is factive.
We say that a formula A is valid with respect to basic modular models (in
symbols basicmodular A) if for any basic modular model M = (W,≤, ∗) and
any w ∈ W we have (M, w)  A.
Lemma 3.6 (Soundness of iJT4CS with respect to basic modular models).
For every formula A:
⊢ A =⇒ basicmodular A
In order to show completeness, we need some auxiliary definitions and
lemmas.
Definition 3.7. We call a set of formulas ∆ prime iff it satisfies the following
conditions:
(i) ∆ has the disjunction property, i.e., A ∨B ∈ ∆ =⇒ A ∈ ∆ or B ∈ ∆;
(ii) ∆ is deductively closed, i.e., for any formula A, if ∆ ⊢ A, then A ∈ ∆;
(iii) ∆ is consistent, i.e., ⊥ /∈ ∆.
From now on, we will use Σ,∆,Γ for prime sets of formulas.
Lemma 3.8. Let N be an arbitrary set of formulas and let A,B and C be
formulas. If
N ∪ {A ∨ B} 0 C, then N ∪ {A} 0 C or N ∪ {B} 0 C.
Proof. By contraposition. Assume that
N ∪ {A} ⊢ C and N ∪ {B} ⊢ C
Then there are finite subsets N1 ⊆ N ∪ {A} and N2 ⊆ N ∪ {B} such that
⊢
∧
N1 → C and ⊢
∧
N2 → C
Now let N ′1 := N1 \ {A} and N
′
2 := N2 \ {B}. Then N
′
1, N
′
2 are finite
subsets of N , and
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⊢
∧
(N ′1 ∪ {A})→ C and ⊢
∧
(N ′2 ∪ {B})→ C.
So
⊢
∧
N ′1 → (A→ C) and ⊢
∧
N ′2 → (B → C).
Strengthening the antecedent, we get
⊢
∧
(N ′1 ∪N
′
2)→ (A→ C) and ⊢
∧
(N ′1 ∪N
′
2)→ (B → C))
and, therefore,
⊢
∧
(N ′1 ∪N
′
2)→ ((A→ C) ∧ (B → C)).
By propositional reasoning we get
⊢
∧
(N ′1 ∪N
′
2)→ ((A ∨B)→ C),
which means that
⊢
∧
(N ′1 ∪N
′
2 ∪ {A ∨ B})→ C.
Since N ′1 and N
′
2 are finite subsets of N , (N
′
1∪N
′
2∪{A∨B} is a finite subset
of N ∪ {A ∨B}, so by definition
N ∪ {A ∨ B} ⊢ C.
Theorem 3.9 (Prime Lemma). Let B be a formula and let N be a set of
formulas such that N 0 B. Then there exists a prime set Π with N ⊆ Π and
Π 0 B.
Proof. Let (An)n∈N be an enumeration of all formulas.
Now we define N0 := N ,
Ni+1 :=
{
Ni ∪ {Ai}, if Ni ∪ {Ai} 0 B
Ni, otherwise
and finally
N⋆ :=
⋃
i∈N
Ni
By induction in i, one can easily show that for all i ∈ N : Ni 0 B and,
therefore, N⋆ 0 B.
It remains to show that N⋆ is prime. We have the following:
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• ⊥ /∈ N⋆: Since ⊥ /∈ Ni for all i ∈ N, which can be shown by induction
on i.
• N⋆ is deductively closed: Assume it is not, i.e., there is a formula A
with
N⋆ ⊢ A but A /∈ N⋆
Since N⋆ ⊢ A but N⋆ 0 B, we know that
N⋆ ∪ {A} 0 B
Otherwise, by the deduction theorem 2.4
N⋆ ⊢ A→ B and N⋆ ⊢ A
so by propositional reasoning,
N⋆ ⊢ B, which contradicts our observation above.
Since (An)n∈N is an enumeration of all formulas, there is some i such
that A = Ai. But then
Ni ∪ {Ai} 0 B.
So by construction
Ni+1 = Ni ∪ {Ai}
and, therefore,
A = Ai ∈ Ni+1 ⊆ N
⋆,
which contradicts our assumption.
• N⋆ has the disjunction property: Assume that C∨D ∈ N⋆. Then there
is some i such that C ∨D = Ai and there are i1, i2 such that
C = Ai1 and D = Ai2
Now we have
N⋆ = N⋆ ∪ {C ∨D} 0 B
By the lemma above it follows that
N⋆ ∪ {C} 0 B or N⋆ ∪ {D} 0 B
In the first case, we have that
Ni1 ∪ {Ai1} 0 B
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so by the definition of Ni1+1,
Ni1+1 = Ni1 ∪ {Ai1} = Ni1 ∪ {C}
which means that C ∈ Ni1+1 and therefore C ∈ N
⋆. The second case
is analogous.
Lemma 3.10. Let ∆ be a prime set and t be a justification term. Then
t−1∆ ⊆ ∆.
Proof. Let A ∈ t−1∆. Then t : A ∈ ∆. Since ∆ is deductively closed, it
contains all axioms, thus t : A → A ∈ ∆. Again, since ∆ is deductively
closed, it follows by (MP ) that A ∈ ∆.
Definition 3.11 (Canonical Basic Modular Model). The canonical basic
modular model is
Bcan := (W can,≤can, ∗can)
where
(i) W can := {∆ ⊆ LJ : ∆ is prime}
(ii) ≤can := ⊆
(iii) ∗can(p,∆) = 1 iff P ∈ ∆
(iv) ∗can(t,∆) := t−1∆ := {A | t : A ∈ ∆}
Lemma 3.12. Bcan is a basic evaluation.
Proof. W 6= ∅: By the consistency of iJT4CS we have that ∅ 0 ⊥, it follows
by the prime lemma 3.9 that there exists a prime set, so W can 6= ∅.
Next, we check the conditons on the sets of formulas t∗
can
w
.
(1) s∗
can
w
· t∗
can
w
⊆ (s · t)∗
w
. Let A ∈ s∗
can
w
· t∗
can
w
. Then there is a formula
B ∈ t∗
can
w
such that B → A ∈ s∗
can
w
. So s : B → A ∈ w and t : B ∈ w.
Since w is a prime set, it is deductively closed, so it contains the axiom
s : (B → A)→ (t : B → s · t : A). Again since w is deductively closed,
it follows by (MP) that s · t : A ∈ w, so A ∈ (s · t)−1w = (s · t)∗
can
w
.
(2) s∗
can
w
∪t∗
can
w
⊆ (s+t)∗
can
w
. Let A ∈ s∗
can
w
∪t∗
can
w
. Case 1: A ∈ s∗
can
w
= s−1w.
Then s : A ∈ w. Since w is deductively closed, it contains the axiom
s : A → (s + t) : A. Thus by (MP) we find (s + t) : A ∈ w, i.e.,
A ∈ (s+ t)−1w = (s+ t)∗
can
w
. The second case is analogous.
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(3) (t, A) ∈ CS =⇒ A ∈ t∗
can
w
. By axiom necessitation we have that
iJT4CS ⊢ t : A, so w ⊢ t : A. Since w is deductively closed, it follows
that t : A ∈ w, so A ∈ t−1w = t∗
can
w
.
(4) s : s∗
can
w
⊆ (!s)∗
can
w
. Let A ∈ s : s∗
can
w
. Then A is of the form s : B
for some formula B ∈ s∗
can
w
= s−1w, i.e., s : B ∈ w. We find that the
axiom (s : B) → !s : (s : B) ∈ w, so !s : (s : B) ∈ w, which means
that s : B ∈ (!s)−1w = (!s)∗
can
w
.
Now we check the monotonicity conditions.
(M1) Assume that ∗(p,Γ) = 1 and Γ ⊆ ∆. By the definition of of ∗ we have
that p ∈ Γ, so p ∈ ∆ hence ∗(p,∆) = 1.
(M2) Now assume that Γ ⊆ ∆. Then t−1Γ ⊆ t−1∆ which means t∗Γ ⊆ t
∗
∆.
Lemma 3.13 (Truth Lemma). For any formula A and any prime set ∆ :
A ∈ ∆ ⇐⇒ (∗can,∆)  A
Proof. By induction on the formula A. We distinguish the following cases.
1. A = p or A = ⊥. By definition.
2. A = B ∧ C. Assume that B ∧ C ∈ ∆. Since ∆ is deductively closed,
we have B ∈ ∆ and C ∈ ∆, so it follows by the induction hypothesis
that (∗can,∆)  B and (∗can,∆)  C.
For the other direction assume that (∗can,∆)  B∧C, so (∗can,∆)  B
and (∗can,∆)  C. By the induction hypothesis, we get that B ∈ ∆
and C ∈ ∆. Since ∆ is deductively closed, it follows that B ∧ C ∈ ∆.
3. A = B∨C. Assume that B∨C ∈ ∆. Since ∆ has the disjunction prop-
erty, it follows that B ∈ ∆ or C ∈ ∆, so by the induction hypothesis,
(∗can,∆)  B or (∗can,∆)  C, so (∗can,∆)  B ∨ C.
For the other direction assume that (∗can,∆)  B ∨ C. Then
(∗can,∆)  B or (∗can,∆)  C,
so by the induction hypothesis, B ∈ ∆ or C ∈ ∆. Since ∆ is deductively
closed, it follows that B ∨ C ∈ ∆.
4. A = B → C. Assume that B → C ∈ ∆. We have to show that
(∗can,∆)  B → C, so let Γ be a prime set such that ∆ ⊆ Γ and
(∗can,Γ)  B. It follows by the induction hypothesis that B ∈ Γ, and
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since B → C ∈ Γ and Γ is deductively closed, we have that C ∈ Γ.
Applying the induction hypothesis again, we get that (∗can,Γ)  C.
For the other direction assume that (∗can,∆)  B → C. We have to
show that B → C ∈ ∆. Assume for a contradiction that B → C /∈ ∆.
Since ∆ is deductively closed, it follows that ∆ 0 B → C. It follows by
the deduction theorem 2.4 that ∆∪{B} 0 C. By the prime lemma 3.9,
there is a prime set Γ such that ∆∪{B} ⊆ Γ and Γ 0 C, so in particular,
C /∈ Γ. By the induction hypothesis it follows that (∗can,Γ)  B and
(∗can,Γ) 2 C, contradicting our assumption that (∗can,∆)  B → C.
5. A = t : B. We have
t : B ∈ ∆ ⇐⇒ B ∈ t−1∆ = ∗can(t,∆) ⇐⇒ (∗can,∆)  t : B.
Lemma 3.14. Bcan is a basic modular model.
Proof. We only have to show factivity, for which we use the truth lemma.
Assume that
A ∈ ∗can(t,∆) = t−1∆.
By Lemma 3.10 we know that t−1∆ ⊆ ∆, so we have A ∈ ∆. By the
truth lemma for the canonical basic modular model, we can conclude that
(∗can,∆)  A. So factivity is shown.
Theorem 3.15 (Completeness of iJT4CS with respect to basic modular mod-
els). For any formula A:
basicmodular A =⇒ iJT4CS ⊢ A
Proof. By contraposition. Assume that iJT4CS 0 A. By the prime lemma
3.9, there exists a prime set ∆ such that ∆ 0 A. In particular, A /∈ ∆. By
the truth lemma 3.13, it follows that
(∗can,∆) 2 A
since this structure is a basic modular model, it follows that
2basicmodular A.
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